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of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Arguably the most important function of money is its role
as a medium of exchange. Wicksell ([1906] 1967, p. 15)
deﬁned a medium of exchange to be “an object which is
taken in exchange, not on its own account, . . . not to be
consumed by the receiver or to be employed in technical
production, but to be exchanged for something else within
a longer or shorter period of time.” He further deﬁned a
general medium of exchange to be an object “which is
habitually, and without hesitation, taken by anybody in
exchange for any commodity” (Wicksell [1906] 1967, p.
17). Related notions include a means of payment, which
is an object used to pay for purchases and settle debts, and
a general means of payment, which is an object that can
always be used to pay for any purchase or settle any debt.
There could be circumstances where the concepts of
means of payment and media of exchange differ. For ex-
ample, there could be legal restrictions that imply taxes
are payable in some object, which would make it a means
of payment, at least for tax purposes, but this would not
necessarily mean that it is accepted as a medium of ex-
change by private agents. Nevertheless, for the purposes
of this essay, we will ignore such circumstances and use
the terms means of payment and media of exchange in-
terchangeably. We are mainly interested in which sorts of
objects will be used as media of exchange and in what
circumstances.
Objects and Circumstances
A commodity money is an object used as a medium of ex-
change that also has use as a consumption good or a pro-
ductive input, at least potentially. A ﬁat money is an ob-
ject used as a medium of exchange that will never be used
as a consumption good or a productive input. More pre-
cisely, Wallace (1980) deﬁnes ﬁat money to be money
that is intrinsically useless and inconvertible. Intrinsic use-
lessness refers to the property that the object will never be
used as a consumption good nor as a production good,
while inconvertibility refers to the fact that it is not backed
by something that has intrinsic worth. Von Mises ([1912]
1934) provides an early discussion of the threefold classi-
ﬁcation of economic objects into consumption goods, pro-
duction goods, and media of exchange. Many objects, in-
cluding any commodity money, for example, can play
more than one role; but ﬁat money by deﬁnition is only
a medium of exchange and never a consumption or pro-
duction good.
A natural question is, What makes an object more or
less desirable as a medium of exchange? A related but
different question is, What makes an object more or less
likely to become a medium of exchange? Textbook dis-
cussions describe many of the intrinsic properties of ob-
jects that make them desirable media of exchange or mon-
ey, such as storability, recognizability, durability, divisibil-
ity, and so on. In addition to these intrinsic properties,
Menger (1892) also emphasized what he called “saleabili-
ty,” or what we call acceptability. We deﬁne the accept-
ability of an object here to be the probability that it is
accepted in exchange by other agents at a given price.
(Whether or not an object is accepted can depend on the
amount offered—for example, it may be difficult to buy
a package of cigarettes in England with U.S. dollars at the
official exchange rate, although perhaps not if one is will-
ing to pay a sufficient dollar price—but we will ignore
this here by taking price as given; see Lippman and
McCall 1986.)
When an object is more readily acceptable to other
people in the economy, it is more likely that each individ-
ual will desire it and accept it as a medium of exchange.
The implication is that the property of acceptability can
have a self-reinforcing nature. Of course, acceptability de-
pends on time, place, and circumstance and is not con-
stant. For example, it is hard to buy cigarettes late at night
with a large-denomination U.S. bill even in the United
States. Also, things that serve as ﬁat or commodity money
in one place or time need not serve as money at other
places or times, as history illustrates.
These observations lead to the conclusion that accept-
ability may not actually be a property of an object as
much as it is a property of social convention. In more
technical economic language, we would say that the ac-
ceptability of an object is a property of an equilibrium, or
perhaps a property of an object in a particular equilibrium.
An Example
Our next goal is to present a simple example of a theoreti-
cal economic model that determines acceptability endoge-
nously and illustrates these points. The model is based on
Kiyotaki and Wright 1991 and forthcoming, where the
interested reader can ﬁnd several elaborations and applica-
tions. (A survey of related models can be found in Ostroy
and Starr 1990.)
Consider an economy with a large number of inﬁnitely
lived agents and a large number of perfectly storable con-
sumption goods, with the property that each agent con-
sumes a fraction x of the goods and each good is con-
sumed by a fraction x of the agents. Assume that all goods
are produced by equal numbers of agents, but that agents
do not produce goods that they themselves consume.
These goods are all indivisible and come in units of size
one. When an agent consumes one unit of a consumption
good, the agent receives utility u and immediately pro-
duces a new good at a cost in terms of disutility c. Note
that agents cannot produce without ﬁrst consuming.
At the initial date, we randomly endow some of the
agents with consumption goods and the rest of the agents
with an intrinsically worthless object that we call money.
Let M be the fraction of agents endowed with money, and
assume for simplicity that this money object is also indi-
visible and that each agent endowed with it is endowed
with exactly one unit. Agents meet bilaterally and at ran-
dom once each period and trade if and only if it is mu-
tually advantageous. However, there is a transaction cost
in terms of disutility, denoted by e, that is incurred by the
receiver whenever that agent accepts any consumption
good in trade. For simplicity, there is no transaction cost
to accepting money here, but this is not essential. (See
Kiyotaki and Wright 1991.)
We seek Nash equilibria in trading strategies, in which
each agent chooses whether to trade or not in order to
maximize the expected discounted utility of consumption
net of production and transaction costs, taking the trading
strategies of other agents as given. Here we focus on
steady-state equilibria, where things do not change over
time, and also on symmetric equilibria, where no agent or
good is treated differently from any other. A property of
such an equilibrium is that agents trade one commodity
for another commodity if and only if the latter is one of
their consumption goods. The reason is that, when other
agents are treating goods symmetrically, the acceptability
of all goods is the same, and therefore there is no advan-tage to trading one good for another if the latter is not
going to be consumed. Since there is a transaction cost,
agents therefore never exchange one good for another un-
less they are going to consume it.
Hence, in the equilibria under consideration, commodi-
ties will never be used as media of exchange, and there-
fore there will be no commodity money; however, ﬁat
money could still potentially act as a medium of exchange,
and this will be the focus of our attention here. (Commod-
ity money is analyzed in a related framework in Kiyotaki
and Wright 1989.) Additionally, the fact that individual
agents do not accept commodities that they do not con-
sume means that the acceptability of any consumption
good is x,since x is the probability with which any good
is one that a random agent consumes. Thus, when two
agents with commodities meet, a barter transaction will be
consummated if and only if there is a “double coincidence
of wants,” as Jevons (1875) put it, in the sense that each
of the two agents is willing to consume the commodity
which the other is trying to trade. A double coincidence
happens with probability x2. The thing to be determined
is the acceptability of money—that is, the probability with
which money is accepted.
To analyze this, suppose a representative agent accepts
money with probability p when others accept it on aver-
age with probability P. We will determine the agent’s
payoff from following this strategy and then ﬁnd the
agent’s optimal choice of p, or best response, given P.
Let Vc and Vm denote the payoffs, respectively, when the
agent has a commodity and when the agent has money at
the end of each period, and let b denote the discount
factor between periods. When the agent has a commodity,
he or she acquires a consumption good next period if and
only if the agent meets someone else with a commodity
and a double coincidence occurs, which happens with
probability (1–M)x2. This yields utility U = u – e – c
(which we assume is positive) from consumption net of
transaction and production costs. Further, the agent ends
next period with money if he or she meets another agent
with money and both sides agree to trade, which occurs
with probability Mxp, and ends next period with a com-
modity in all other instances. Hence, the payoff to having
money and trying to barter is
(1) Vc = b{(1–M)x2U + MxpVm + (1–Mxp)Vc}.
Similarly, when our representative agent has money, he
or she acquires a consumption good next period if and
only if the agent meets someone with a commodity and
the two agents agree to trade, which occurs in this case
with probability (1–M)xP. Further, our agent ends next
period with a commodity with this same probability and
with money otherwise, since the only way an agent with
money can ever acquire a commodity is to trade for one
consumption good, consume, and produce. (It can be
shown that agents never trade money for commodities that
they do not consume in equilibrium.) Hence, the payoff to
having a commodity is given by
(2) Vm = b{(1–M)xP(U+Vc)+[ 1–( 1 –M)x P ] V m }.
By manipulating these two equations, it is easy to ver-
ify the following results. First, if P < x, then Vm < Vc;
that is, when money is less acceptable than commodities,
the payoff from trading with money is less than the payoff
from barter. In this case, the individual’s best response is
never to trade commodities for money, which means p =
0. Second, if P > x, then Vm > Vc; that is, when money
is more acceptable than commodities, the payoff from
trading with money is greater than the payoff from barter.
In this case, the individual’s best response is always to
trade commodities for money, which means p =1 .
Finally, if P = x, then Vm = Vc; that is, when money is
just as acceptable as commodities, the payoffs from trad-
ing with money and from bartering are equal. In this case,
the individual is indifferent to accepting money and could
choose any p between 0 and 1.
Therefore, there are exactly three equilibria in the mod-
el: P =0 ,P= 1, and P = x. In the ﬁrst case, money is
not acceptable; in the second, it is a generally acceptable
medium of exchange; and in the third, it is a partially
acceptable medium of exchange. Although the intrinsic
properties of money are the same in each case, expecta-
tions as to acceptability have a self-fulﬁlling tendency,
which inﬂuences whether or not money serves as a medi-
um of exchange and whether it is generally or only par-
tially acceptable. Notice also how the use of money helps
to alleviate the difficulty of pure barter. When P =1 ,a
double coincidence is not required to acquire consumption
goods; one can ﬁrst sell produced goods for money and
then use the money to buy consumption goods. Especially
when x is small, as it will be when there are many highly
specialized commodities in existence, for example, the use
of a generally acceptable money can entail a substantial
increase in the efficiency of exchange.
Intrinsic Properties
The above example illustrates one way in which the use
of a medium of exchange and its acceptability can be de-
termined endogenously in a model. Acceptability is not
actually a property of the object, but depends on which
equilibrium we are in. However, this is not to say that
intrinsic properties of objects are unimportant. Suppose,
for example, there is a per-period storage cost of holding
money, denoted by k.For small positive k,there are still
three equilibria, as described above, except now the equi-
librium where money is only partially acceptable has P >
x because money’s acceptability has to increase to com-
pensate for the deterioration in its fundamental properties.
Thus, even if the ﬂow return on money (which is –k in
this example) is less than that on real commodities (which
is zero in this example), there are still equilibria in which
money circulates, because of its acceptability. (See Hicks
1935 for a discussion of this issue.) If k gets sufficiently
large, however, then there cannot exist any equilibrium
where money is acceptable, and the unique equilibrium
entails P = 0. A sufficiently bad money has no hope of
serving as a medium of exchange.
*This essay is reprinted, with the publishers’ permission, from The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Money and Finance, ed. Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John Eat-
well; London: Macmillan Press, New York: Stockton Press. © Macmillan Press 1992.
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